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1. Introduction. 
Over the last two decades of the 20th century, bullying in the 
workplace, including both mobbing and harassment, has been the subject 
of much attention from Italian labour lawyers1 and courts. As Italian law 
has no special rules dealing with mobbing and lacks a statutory definition 
of the phenomenon2, courts and legal scholars have been called upon to 
seek a precise definition for themselves and to identify the general 
characteristics required to constitute what we commonly define as 
mobbing. Several academic disciplines (such as psychology, medicine, 
sociology, etc.) have shown increasing interest in it3, and there is no 
doubt that dialogue with these disciplines has influenced the courts’ 
definitions and conceptualizations of mobbing to some extent. The 
problem is that the medical and/or sociological sciences, on the one 
hand, and the legal sciences, on the other, often use a different language 
and consider different meanings of the term “mobbing”. 
Heated discussion has long been ongoing among Italian labour law 
scholars regarding the most effective way to combat bullying in the 
workplace. The application of the definition of “mobbing” adopted by the 
courts has been strongly criticized by some academics4 because non-legal 
definitions developed in fields pertaining to sociology are unlikely to be 
applicable automatically5; other lawyers suggest avoiding the term 
“mobbing” altogether, as use of this term raises more questions than it 
answers and can only be applied with the help of a legal filter, such as 
that provided by legislation on moral harassment6; lastly, rather than 
using the notions from psychology, other writers recognize that the 
concept has no substantive meaning but can be used as a “legal 
framework” and, to a certain extent, play a “cognitive” role despite 
providing little guidance for practitioners7. 
It is now anachronistic to propose a statutory solution to end 
“bullying in the workplace”. It should be stressed that in recent years 
                                                          
1 There is a vast literature on the subject in Italy. Special mention may be made, for 
example, of Tosi, 2004; Pedrazzoli, 2007; Scarponi, 2009. 
2 On this topic a regional Law for Lazio (no. 16 of 11 July 2002) attempted to introduce an 
organic regulation but this attempt failed as the Constitutional Court held the norm to be 
unconstitutional (ruling no. 359 of 19 December 2003): see, for example, Lassandari, 2007, 
p. 40. 
3 For early studies on this topic see Leymann, 1993; Id., 1996; Ege, 1997; Id., 2019. 
4 See Proia 2005, p. 827; Boscati, 2001; Gragnoli, 2003. 
5 Del Punta, 2003, p. 539; Viscomi, 2002, p. 47, Tullini, 2000, p. 251; Luciani, 2007, p. 
146. 
6 The term ”moral harassment” was first adopted to define the phenomenon by Hirigoyen 
2000; see also Lerouge 2010 p. 109; Contra Ege 2019, p. 44. 
7 Pedrazzoli, 2009, p. 5 
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Italian courts have been under increasing pressure to respond to the new 
challenges of information technology and have addressed problems 
relating to the spread of ”new” forms of harassment and offensive 
conduct8 capable of threatening, humiliating or infringing the dignity of 
the person; and they have therefore attempted to assess the adequacy of 
the traditional judge-made notion and to develop a new, more flexible 
legal concept, known as “straining”.  
2. Mobbing: a judge-made definition. The controversial 
role of malicious intent.  
According to the traditional judge-made definition, the term 
“mobbing” should be understood in a broad sense to include, on the one 
hand, behaviour that, taken alone, can be classified as illegal and can 
lead to prosecution in a criminal court (e.g., sexual harassment, 
discrimination, unjustified transfer, etc.). On the other hand, there is 
“neutral conduct” (for instance, any vexatious form of non-verbal 
communication) not constituting illegal behaviour but systematically 
connected by the intention of harassing the victim. At the same time, 
after identifying the provisions on which a victim of mobbing can rely, the 
courts and employment tribunals have interpreted very narrowly the 
general prerequisites that must be fulfilled in order to establish a 
successful claim based on mobbing, mostly borrowing the parameters 
developed in medical science. 
In a 2017 case, for example, the question arose as to whether a 
situation in which a private civil servant had been relieved of all tasks and 
relegated to total inactivity for a long period of time could be qualified as 
“mobbing”. The Court of Cassation9 held that stringent requirements need 
to be satisfied for a claim of “mobbing” to be established. First of all, 
mobbing must be seen as a series of single actions of a persecutory 
nature over a long period of time, which, if taken alone would be either 
illegal or lawful, all systematically linked by the goal of harassing the 
victim. The Court therefore focuses on the continuity of the actions on the 
part of the perpetrator (the employer or supervisor or other employees 
subjected to the leadership of the former). Secondly, the behaviour in 
question must be such as to violate the personality, dignity, and/or 
physical or mental health of a worker, jeopardizing his or her future 
                                                          
8 One commentator attributes the increasing frequency of workplace bullying in America to 
“the growth of the service-sector economy, the global profit squeeze, the decline of 
unionization, the diversification of the workforce, and increased reliance on contingent 
workers”: Yamada 2000. On the broad variety of legal strategies used to protect workers 
from bullying in some countries, see Lippel 2010. 
9 Cass., January 27, 2017, no. 2142. 
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career. Thirdly, in order to establish a successful claim for mobbing, there 
must be some causal link between the breach of duty brought about by 
the described behaviour and the harm suffered; and lastly, the court 
stipulated that the employer has to prove that the employee acted with 
the clear intention of doing harm10. 
Although the courts have long played a significant role in shaping the 
definition of mobbing and have sought to identify the phenomenon, 
stating what precisely the general characteristics that constitute this 
concept are is still highly problematic11.  
One of the most critical aspects relating to the traditional judge-made 
definition concerns the role played by the malicious intent of the 
perpetrator of harassment. In this respect, courts and labour law scholars 
have adopted two specific approaches that differ little from the previous 
approach to antidiscrimination law. Opinions diverge on whether the 
causal link between harassment (mobbing) and damages is an objective 
or a subjective standard. In some rulings, in order to avoid introducing a 
sort of “objective responsibility”, the Court of Cassation held that this link 
is established only if malicious intent on the part of the perpetrator of the 
harassment has been proved12. This approach probes the mental state of 
the perpetrator and requires that the employer, intentionally or 
negligently, unlawfully injures or endangers directly (e.g., damaging or 
stealing private belongings) or indirectly the victim’s health, right of 
personality, property rights, or financial interests (dolo generico or dolo 
specifico respectively in Italian) 13. The subjective approach has also been 
endorsed by some legal scholars and is justified by the fact that mobbing 
must be seen as a combination of single events where the malicious 
intention of the perpetrator of harassment, i.e. the purpose of violating 
the right of personality, dignity, or health of the victim, can be considered 
as a “functional cohesion factor”, as it systematically links the single 
events14.  
In other words, some forms of behaviour, consisting of acts that, 
taken alone, are illegal or unlawful in themselves, such as discrimination, 
unjustified transfer, unjustified denial of promotion, downgrading 
responsibilities without good reason etc., can be considered mobbing only 
                                                          
10 For these preconditions, see also Tribunal of Turin 18th December 2002. 
11 The notion of workplace bullying is still a subject of controversy also in medical literature. 
An up-to-date notion, constructed on the Leyman definition but calibrated more towards the 
context of the company and legal responsibility, is that developed in Hauptverband der 
gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. See Windemuth, Paridon, Kohstall, 2003, pp. 59-62.  
12 Cass. May 23, 2013, no. 12725; T.A.R. Liguria, Sez. II, July 21, 2010, n. 645. 
13 T.A.R. Lazio January 13, 2015, no. 439. 
14 Tullini, 2000, p. 257. 
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if the victim can prove the malicious intent of the employer to bring about 
the social exclusion of the employee15. 
This approach has been challenged by writers who support the 
opposite view, the so-called theory of “objective harm”, whereby 
mobbing exists even in the absence of malicious intent by the perpetrator 
of the vexatious acts. Victims of workplace bullying only have to prove 
that the mobber’s behaviour impinges on the dignity of the person 
concerned: not only does the burden of proof for the harassment lie with 
the employee but also that regarding the causality between such acts and 
the harm occurred. There is no need to prove positive intention to violate 
the victim’s right of personality. According to some scholars, this 
approach, which considers the effects rather than the intentions, can 
produce best results in terms of the effectiveness of the regulation, as 
proof of the state of mind or malicious intent is not necessary to give rise 
to a claim for workplace bullying, and therefore the burden of proof is 
not, from past experience, expected to be so difficult to meet. 
This opinion, endorsed, albeit with some degree of ambiguity, by the 
Constitutional Court, has also been supported to some extent in recent 
rulings of the Supreme Court, which held that conduct violating the 
victim's health, right of personality, or property does not exonerate the 
employer from liability in the absence of malicious intent by the 
perpetrator of the vexatious acts16. It is probably premature to speak of a 
reversal of the previous case law; however, there is no doubt that the 
Court has decided to review its position on the distribution of the burden 
of proof between employees and employers in mobbing cases in an 
attempt to reach a compromise between the two approaches. In 
particular, it is recognized that, within the meaning of art. 2729 of the 
Italian Civil Code, evidence of intent can also be provided indirectly, as 
the presumption that mobbing has occurred can be deduced from the 
general characteristics of the behaviour in question, such as the 
continuity between the single events17. 
This view can be endorsed as it is in line with the basic canons of 
fairness and justice, insofar as it identifies the victim of mobbing as a 
“weaker party” with regard to the availability of suitable means to prove 
malicious intent. However, it should be noted that these requirements 
could be better fulfilled by using remedies in anti-discrimination law, 
which has changed the burden of proof in discrimination cases, in view of 
the fact that the defendant has much better knowledge of what occurred 
                                                          
15 Viscomi, 2002, p. 53 
16 Cass. June 20, 2018 n. 16256, cf. Nunin, 2019, p. 380 
17 Aloisi, 2018; Lazzari, 2018. 
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than the claimant18. This means that if the complainant proves facts from 
which a court could conclude, in the absence of adequate explanation, 
that the respondent committed an act of discrimination against him or 
her, the judge will find for the complaint, unless the respondent proves 
that (s)he did not commit the act. 
The crucial question therefore arises of whether, and to what extent, 
the concept of harassment, as identified in the legislative decrees on 
discrimination, can include mobbing (Art. 2, para. 3, of Legislative Decree 
No. 215/2003; Art. 2, para. 3, of Legislative Decree No. 216/2003) 
provided that discrimination and mobbing have, as will be seen below, 
some key characteristics in common, especially in terms of 
consequences.  
3. Mobbing and harassment. The broad use of the term 
”harassment”.  
Among labour law scholars, the concept of harassment and the 
notion of mobbing are often used interchangeably in view of the fact that 
the personality, dignity or physical and/or psychological integrity of an 
employee can be violated both when moral or sexual harassment based 
on protected factors, actually takes place, and when the victim’s health, 
right of personality, and property rights are endangered, as typically 
occurs in cases of workplace bullying19.  
The Italian legislator confirmed the view supported by a number of 
legal scholars before the amendments were introduced20 and included 
harassment within the concept of discrimination, extending the definition 
of moral harassment to include that related to an employee’s race, 
colour, or nationality, so that unlawful harassment can now refer to any 
of the protected characteristics, other than pregnancy, maternity, 
marriage and civil partnership (according to art. 2 Legislative Decree 215 
and 216 of 2003: “Harassment is considered discrimination”, or in the 
original text “sono considerate discriminazioni le molestie”). Not very 
surprisingly, in an initial definition of sexual harassment, one of the 
conditions necessary to meet the definition of harassment is constituted 
by a typical element of the notion of bullying in the workplace developed 
                                                          
18 In many cases, Italian Courts have used the means provided by antidiscrimination law to 
establish some alleviations of the standard of proof. See Cass. 5 November 2012 no. 
18927; Cass.15 November 2016, no. 23286, in temilavoro.it, 2017, with a comment by 
Venditti. For the opposite view in the German system, see Bag 25 October 2007. See also 
Fischinger 2010, p. 180. 
19 Malzani, 2014, p. 331. 
20 De Simone, 2019, p. 32; Lazzeroni, 2007, p. 379. 
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in case law and by legal scholars, despite its absence in the European 
definition, i.e. continuity between the single events. 
There is no doubt that the links between sexual harassment and 
mobbing are so close, starting from the factual level, that it is difficult to 
draw a sharp distinction. Harassment often constitutes the preamble to, 
or becomes a component part of, a mobbing strategy: this happens 
whenever an offender initially confines himself to sexual harassment and 
subsequently (perhaps as a result of refusal by the victim) becomes a 
mobber, being convinced that the person who rejected him must be 
punished. Ultimately, the demarcation line is not clear as there is 
sometimes an overlap between the two forms of behaviour, and it cannot 
be ruled out that harassment actually becomes a means of mobbing 
whenever the mobber decides to harm the victim through unwanted 
sexual acts in addition to comments of a sexual nature. In view of this 
factual link, it is not surprising that, since the earliest EU legislation, 
sexual harassment has generally been considered in concomitance with 
mobbing21.  
As the workers’ protected interests in cases of moral harassment and 
mobbing are similar, it is important to clarify whether, and how far, the 
answer to the question concerning the necessarily intentional nature of 
actions constituting mobbing may be found in anti-discrimination law.  
It is widely known that this fundamental aspect of the concept of 
discrimination has been subjected to close scrutiny in case law on sex 
discrimination. The ECJ holds that the causal link between the protected 
interests and the adverse treatment received by the victim is established 
when the treatment is based on, or caused by, some prohibited 
classification, regardless of any malicious intent by the perpetrator of the 
vexatious acts 22. In other words, the existence of some subjective mental 
state cannot be considered as a precondition for establishing direct 
discrimination23. 
As far as harassment is concerned, the definitions refer to “unwanted 
conduct” that takes places with the “purpose or effect” of violating the 
dignity of the person concerned, in particular where it creates an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment 
                                                          
21 See in particular the European Parliament Resolution on harassment in the workplace 
(2001/2339(INI)). AS-0283-2001 and, more recently, Resolution no. 2055 of 11.9.2018 on 
measures to prevent and combat mobbing and sexual harassment in the workplace, in 
public spaces, and political life in the EU (A8-0265/2018).  
22 Case C-127/92 [1993] ECR I-5535. 
23 The USA is the only jurisdiction where a subjective approach has been endorsed by the 
Courts. See Kaithan, 2015, p. 71. On the concept of discrimination and the role of the intent 
in UK jurisprudence see, recently, Santagata de Castro, 2019, p. 229. 
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(art. 26 Decree no. 198 of 2006). The broad definition is similar to that of 
mobbing, as it does not focus on the objective characteristics of the 
forbidden behaviour, but on its ability to create an intimidating, hostile 
(etc.) environment and to affect the dignity of the person concerned. The 
legislator not only adopts a “teleological” criterion, but in referring to the 
“unwanted” aspect of the act, clarifies that harassment must also be 
assessed subjectively, considering the perception of the complainant. 
Unlike mobbing, the concept of harassment under antidiscrimination 
legislation requires neither continuity between the single events nor 
evidence of the intention of the perpetrator of the harassment. 
The wording is vague as Italian legislation requires the unwanted 
conduct to be “based on” the relevant protected characteristic (“per 
ragioni connesse al sesso” [“for reasons connected with sex”]): therefore 
it could be interpreted as referring to the intention of the perpetrator of 
the harassment. However, such an interpretation would conflict with 
European law, where there is nothing to allow emphasis of the 
importance of intention24. EU antidiscrimination legislation makes it clear 
that the behaviour (and not the reason for it) is related to sex. 
Although the definition refers to an action that requires “the aim” of 
violating the complainant’s dignity as well as creating an intimidating, 
hostile, etc, enviroment, it should be be pointed out that this approach 
also focuses on the “effect” of the undesired behaviour (Dir. nos. 43 and 
78 of 2000 and no. 73 of 2002). Moreover, it would be difficult to deny 
that the subjective approach, as in discrimination law, might create 
problems regarding the effectiveness of anti-discrimination protection: 
the burden of proof, lying with the victim of harassment, is often hard to 
fulfill in practice. The complainant is obliged to present evidence to 
support the presumption that moral harassment has occurred and, in 
particular, has to prove that the acts of harassment took place as well as 
the causality between these acts and the harm that occurred. However, a 
claimant seeking to establish a prima facie case is likely to encounter 
some difficulties proving the facts in the event of ambiguous behaviour 
(ambiguous comments or apparently chance groping). Moreover, in most 
cases, the offender deliberately tries to avoid acting in the presence of 
witnesses. 
The case of mobbing differs insomuch, as we have seen, that the 
employee is protected against actions liable to infringe the dignity of the 
                                                          
24 In German legal scholarship, see Bauer, Krieger, 2015, § 3 Rn. 54, and lastly, very 
clearly, Schäfer, 2018, p. 60, who, referring to the formulation of the directives, states: 
”Für die Richtlinien ist „jede Form von […] Verhalten sexueller Natur“ in Betracht zu ziehen. 
Die subjektive Komponente, die in der nationalen Formulierung angelegt ist, findet hier 
keinen Eingang”. 
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person or his/her legal interests regardless of whether there is a 
protected characteristic (sex, race, sexual orientation), and can invoke 
strong remedies to successfully establish a contractual claim against the 
employer (art. 2087 ICC). On the other hand, the typical elements of the 
notion of bullying in the workplace that have developed in case law are 
‘continuity’ and ‘reiteration’. Yet, these different characteristic elements 
do not seem to be significant enough to differentiate mobbing from 
harassment in terms of the applicability of antidiscrimination legislation. 
This may mean that in the case of workplace bullying it ought to be 
unnecessary to prove any particular motive or intention to cause harm on 
the part of the employer. 
Emphasis on the common ground between mobbing and harassment 
can be derived from two important changes to the legal framework. The 
first concerns the most recent Corte di Cassazione case law on mobbing. 
The Court has shown a tendency to reduce the scope of reiteration, which 
had been the main (and characteristic) aspect and has led to a new 
model of bullying in the workplace, known as straining, discussed in § 4 
below.  
The second important change regards the scope of antidiscrimination 
law: the acts prohibited by anti-discrimination law have been significantly 
broadened in more recent legislation, and now also cover some forms of 
unlawful harassment. The point to be made is that in the light of this 
tendency, the concept of bullying in the workplace appears closer to that 
of harassment/discrimination under EU and Italian legislation. Both 
prohibited forms of behaviour focus on the violation of dignity. In our 
opinion, harassment cannot be considered a new form of discrimination 
as the Italian legislator has not altered the scope of the concept of 
”discrimination” by implementing the European definition of the 
concept25, which still requires a comparison. However, it did extend the 
various remedies available to targets of discrimination also to the victims 
of harassment. 
In this way, the new provisions brought no change to the genetic 
code of the antidiscrimination legislation, i.e. its historical aim to protect 
the rights of social groups (more likely to be) at risk of marginalization 
but laid great emphasis on the link between equality and human dignity. 
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the (broad) definition of 
harassment is very similar to that (judge-made) of mobbing, as in both 
cases the main legal condition for applying the specific remedies (see 
below) available is that the employer’s behaviour in the case in point 
                                                          
25 For an opposing view: Corazza, 2009, p. 106 and Barbera, 2003, p. 413 according to 
whom discrimination includes ”harassment” (sexual and moral). 
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impinges on the dignity of the person26. In effect, there are a growing 
number of scholars who support the opinion that the notion of 
harassment could be invoked in a broad sense so that all (or almost all) 
cases of mobbing could fall within its scope of application. 
The main advantage of invoking this notion is that of ”avoiding 
excessive recourse by those interpreting the law to the findings of 
medical science and psychology”27, making it easier to question the 
subjective approach in cases of mobbing and thus alleviate the victim's 
burden of proof28, as the victim would therefore be able to take 
advantage of the more favourable provisions found in antidiscrimination 
Law (art. 40 of Decree no. 198/2006). However, Italian case law, unlike 
other jurisdictions (see below), only rarely seems to give necessary 
weight to the similarities between the two definitions. As Italian law lacks 
a statutory definition of mobbing, the courts have tended to refer to art. 
2087 of the Italian Civil Code, stating the duty to protect not only 
employees’ “physical integrity” but also their “moral personality” (a duty 
that can be correctly classified as an obligation to protect). The reference 
to “moral personality” is an important means to guarantee effective 
application of the basic principles laid down in the Constitution by arts 2 
and 32 in relation to art. 41 of the Constitution, such as the constitutional 
guarantee of the dignity of the worker29. 
Art. 2087 of the Italian Civil Code therefore adopts a very dynamic 
method and can be considered an adequate means of ensuring that a 
victim of mobbing can successfully establish a claim against an employer 
in cases of mobbing and straining alike. According to this provision, in the 
management of his enterprise the employer not only has a duty to adopt 
all measures necessary to protect the physical integrity and moral 
personality of his employees but also a duty to (actively) protect the 
employee from the behaviour of supervisors, co-workers, and third 
persons over whom the employer exercises influence30. 
However, there is no doubt that (many) cases of mobbing can come 
under both the duty to protect the employees’ health and safety and the 
scope of anti-discrimination law. This tends to support the view of those 
who argue that an action that can be defined as harassment can also fulfil 
further requirements so as to constitute mobbing31. In practice, it is also 
                                                          
26 Malzani, 2014, p. 333; Corazza, 2007, p. 108 
27 Scarponi, 2009, p. 29; see also Del Punta, 2006, p. 21. 
28 Del Punta, 2013, p. 25 
29 Vallebona, 2005, p. 2. 
30 Del Punta, 2006; On the duty to provide safe conditions of work (art. 2087 c.c.) see also 
Zoppoli L., 2008, p. 8; Natullo, 2007.  
31 Benecke, 2003, p. 227 speaks of a «Spezialfall». 
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necessary to take into account that neither definition, being constructed 
in teleological terms, focuses on the structural characteristics of the 
unlawful conduct but on its potential to violate personal dignity32.  
Whether or not the most sophisticated anti-discrimination protection 
techniques aimed at countering harassment by employers are applicable 
depends only on the kind of relationship in practice between mobbing and 
harassment. The identification of a species-to-genus relationship – in 
addition to the advantages mentioned above – would offer important 
opportunities from the perspective of protecting the worker's right of 
personality33.  
From this standpoint, the attempt – made in some judgments – to 
draw too sharp a distinction between mobbing and harassment is not at 
all convincing. In this regard, to quote one example, it may be worth 
mentioning a decision in which the Court of Como (May 22, 2001) 
rejected the employee’s claim, making a rather arbitrary theoretical 
distinction. According to the court, mobbing – also in view of its 
ethological genesis – should be characterized by a collective dimension, 
aiming to force the victim to leave the company and terminate his or her 
contract of employment. Moreover, it would include a ”set of actions, 
each of which is formally legitimate and apparently inoffensive”. In 
contrast, the Court considers harassment to be an individual action 
aiming to humiliate or harass the victim. The censured behaviour is 
therefore to be regarded more as bullying than as harassment since ”the 
action is carried out by one person”, whereas mobbing involves more 
persons and aims to drive the victim from the company.  
This view could be criticized as being inadequate because it 
emphasizes two requirements that are, in practical terms, more or less 
irrelevant. The idea that mobbing is to be regarded as a collective 
phenomenon and cannot therefore be considered to be such whenever 
the hostile or persecutory behaviour in the workplace is carried out by a 
single person, is far from convincing. 
Moreover, the aim of driving the victim from the company cannot be 
accepted as a helpful and valid criterion to distinguish mobbing and 
harassment.  
As discussed above, the existence of a clear intention to do harm 
cannot be considered a precondition for establishing that a given conduct 
is indeed mobbing. The view that mobbing can take place only if the 
victim can prove the malicious intent of the employer to bring about the 
social exclusion of the employee is very questionable. Moreover, it is 
                                                          
32 Viscomi, 2002, p. 59. 
33 Corazza, 2007, p. 112. 
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quite possible for someone to regard a rival colleague as an obstacle to 
their career advancement and therefore decides to damage his or her 
reputation and work conditions in order to cause their (physical, moral 
and psychological) isolation, without aiming for any exclusion (horizontal 
mobbing).  
However, in a more recent ruling, instead of taking into account the 
possible similarities and points of overlapping between mobbing and 
discriminatory behaviour, the Court (Tribunale di Como, March 20, 2017, 
No. 36) held that the employer’s behaviour was to be regarded as sexual 
harassment: in this case the employer made no attempt to contain his 
irrepressible expansiveness and had manifested this behaviour with 
almost daily frequency, consisting of vulgar jokes, comments of a sexual 
nature, allusions, and physical contact of a sexual nature: since it was 
not a matter of ”one single act of harassment but repeated actions, 
systematic hostilities occurring over a long period of time (almost daily 
for over 5 years)”, connected not by ”an intent to make a sexual 
approach, but by the sole purpose of causing damage, offending, and 
humiliating the victim”, the Court could have also defined the behaviour 
as mobbing, or in any case, recognized an instrumental relationship; 
however, this did not happen, and the court made absolutely no 
reference to art. 2087 of the Italian Civil Code.  
Lastly, it is interesting to reflect on the different lines developed in 
the courts of other jurisdictions, such as that of Germany, where mobbing 
has also been the subject of great attention. It should be pointed out that 
while in Italian case law mobbing and harassment are, as a rule, 
understood to be alternative, if not antithetical, German case law, on the 
contrary, while maintaining an appropriate distinction, appears to be 
more inclined to endorse a broader definition of harassment, with the 
practical implication that this concept is increasingly being extended to 
various kinds of mobbing. 
As in Italy, German law has no legal concept corresponding to 
mobbing even if case law has played a very important role in its 
development. According to a first definition used by the Federal Labour 
Court, before the General Act on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz - AGG) of 2006 was adopted, mobbing is to be 
understood as a ”behaviour systematically aimed at opposing, harassing 
or discriminating either on the part of colleagues or by the supervisor”34 
or in ”repeated and interdependent actions” (“fortgesetzte, aufeinander 
aufbauende oder ineinander übergreifende”) with the purpose of violating 
the fundamental rights of personality inherent in the employment 
                                                          
34 Bag, January 15, 1997, in Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht [NZA-RR] 1997, 781,  
WORKPLACE BULLYING IN ITALY. MALICIOUS INTENT AND ROLE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .IT – 399/2019 
relationship, as well as other equally protected rights, such as the dignity, 
honour, or health of the victim35.  
The most prominent characteristic of the notion of bullying in the 
workplace is that this violation is deemed to be a combination of single, 
inherently neutral actions, systematically linked by the goal of forcing the 
victim to terminate the employment contract. This is not the case in the 
event of harassment (Belästigung) as specified in § 3 c. 3 of the AGG, 
which, while normally characterized by repeated behaviour, may well 
take a different form when there is only one single act. In both cases the 
employer’s behaviour must potentially violate the victim’s rights or 
dignity. In this perspective the Bundesarbeitsgericht (“Bag”), in more 
recent rulings, not only emphasizes that the definitions are conceptually 
very similar, but also clearly states that the definition of Belästigung 
embodies the notion of ”mobbing”, which is characterized by the fact that 
the intimidating environment to which the AGG refers is not created by a 
single and isolated action, but rather by a series of single actions36. 
Therefore, the general elements that constitute what is understood 
as mobbing and harassment are not exactly the same: also in German 
law, the two definitions differ in more than one element. In contrast to 
harassment, mobbing – which the courts have found to be in breach of a 
provision stating a more general duty of protection 
(Rücksichtnahmepflicht: co. 2 of § 241 BGB) (Bag February 28, 2010), as 
a specification of the duty of good faith referred to in § 242 BGB 
(Fürsorgepflicht) (Lag Thüringen, February 15, 2001) – requires the 
offender's actions to be culpable, namely either intentional or negligent 
(Verschulden) (Bag October 25, 2007, cit.). Moreover, even in the 
presence of this element, harassment (”diskriminierendes Mobbing”) 
occurs only when the conduct is related to a protected characteristic the 
victim has or is thought to have (race, sex, religion etc.) given that the 
AGG cannot be considered an anti-mobbing regulation37, so that only in 
this case will the mobbed worker be able to denounce the double 
unlawfulness of the conduct and take advantage of the privileged 
protection provided by § 15, c. 1-2 of the AGG38. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 LAG Thüringen, 15 February 2001. 
36 Bag, October 25, 2007, in Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht [NZA-RR], 2011, 378 [379]. 
See also Fuchs, Baumgärtner, 2019. 
37 Latzel, 2012, p. 100 
38 Benecke, 2008, p. 363 
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4. The fragility of the definition of mobbing and the 
problematic use of the new concept of straining.  
Intent is not the only problematic element characterizing the judge-
made definition of mobbing, which has been borrowed from the medical 
and/or sociological sciences. This definition is also challenged on other 
grounds. It is crucial to note that the spread of ”new” forms of 
harassment and aggression to the emotional sphere – through the 
development of information technology, the greater role of highly 
specialized tasks and the increasing mobility and flexibility of labour 
policies associated with the excessive stimulation of production, 
productivity, and efficiency39 – gives rise to a growing gap between the 
legal model, developed through ”praetorian” law, and social phenomena, 
which takes more and more different forms. In such a situation there is a 
growing need for the concept of mobbing to adapt and extend in scope. 
In particular, courts seek to argue that alleged mobbing actually took 
place even in situations that could not be considered such because there 
was no continuity between the single events; but they frequently also 
adopt a narrow definition of mobbing and argue that the definition cannot 
be used in cases where this important element is lacking, thus depriving 
the employee of adequate protection. An important case – in a judgment 
handed down before the term “straining” appeared in any of the Court’s 
decisions – is that of a municipal employee who suffered serious 
prejudice as a result of removal from a management role in a prestigious 
operating sector, at the same time having to accept relegation to a task 
of equal, albeit clearly less important, rank in addition to being 
transferred to a poorly equipped office, lacking personnel and material 
resources. 
Even if in this case there were no repeated or systematic attacks on 
the target(s) because there was only one action, the Court doubted that 
an act of mobbing might be attributed to the employer since ”the 
employee suddenly found himself deprived of decision-making, 
managerial, and operative power”40. In another case, the Court argues 
that bullying may occur (and therefore the employer can be considered 
liable for the legal consequences) in a situation where the employer, after 
inviting a female worker to resign, gives her an excessive workload, not 
only from the quantitative but also from the qualitative point of view: in 
the case at hand, the employer changed the range of tasks that the 
employee had been used to working on and assigned her multiple 
                                                          
39 Ichino, 2007. 
40 Trib. Lanciano, February 1, 2001 
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activities, some of which were impossible to perform due to her lack of 
adequate professional skills41. The Court decided that ”although these are 
activities which, taken individually, are relatively simple, it is clear that 
performing them simultaneously could justify shortcomings without any 
real disciplinary content or actual inertia from the point of view of the 
obligation of diligence, (...) provided that, for the company, normal 
diligence was perfection, and any imperfection a lack of diligence”. In 
neither of these cases are the arguments minimally convincing, since the 
use of the definition of mobbing in situations where there is only one 
action is in obvious contradiction to the established case law, according to 
which the rules regulating the topic are applicable only if mobbing can be 
seen as a combination of single events, irrespective of whether the 
psychiatric illness suffered by the employee can be considered as the 
result of being overworked. Hence it is necessary to fine-tune the case 
law on mobbing in order to render the concept more inclusive and adapt 
its traditional structure to an ever changing reality and a wider variety of 
concrete cases. 
It is interesting to note that two alternative solutions can be offered: 
the first option is to continue to leave the problems of interpretation to 
the labour courts, which could choose to extend the notion of mobbing, 
interpreting it in a way that is compatible with the Constitution, in order 
to widen the series of events that may entitle the victim to claim 
damages. The second option is to introduce a new and distinct legal 
category in order to bring the hitherto excluded cases of harassment back 
into the scope of protection.  
Italian case law signals a preference for the second solution: 
adopting the term “straining”, coined by Harald Ege: it expands on the 
concept of mobbing and uses a completely new category, similar to 
bullying but characterized by the fact that it can be inferred from one 
single action, although its effects last over time, subjecting the victim to 
a particular condition of stress far greater than that normally arising from 
the job.  
According to the allusive image used by Ege himself, the 
phenomenon could be likened to that of a “pebble in the pond”, 
“extending itself in concentric circles even after the first of them has now 
disappeared under water”42. In order to establish a successful claim 
based on straining it is necessary to prove that there is at least one single 
act and that it has systematic and ongoing negative effects on the 
                                                          
41 Trib. Milano, February 28, 2003; on compensation for “overwork” Cass. June 7, 2007, n. 
13309; Cass. September 1, 1997, n. 8267; Cass. September 2, 2015, n. 17438. 
42 Ege, 2019. 
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personality, dignity or health of the victim; moreover, it is necessary to 
distinguish between two types of harassment or abuse: those involving 
physical or social isolation, general passivity towards the victim, and 
material lack of (appropriate) work (“under-activation”, such as a change 
to a lower job position or forced inactivity) on the one hand, and those 
involving an excessive workload (“over-activation”, “over work”) on the 
other. 
The new legal category was adopted for the first time in 2005 in a 
pioneering court ruling of the Court of Bergamo, which, being called upon 
to rule on the case of a worker forced into total inactivity for over two 
years, clarified that the employee was entitled to pecuniary damages for 
demotion and, if he or she suffered sexual harassment or if the victim's 
health was harmed, to damages for pain and suffering (“danni 
esistenziali”). The Court held that protection from harm caused by 
mobbers extends to that caused by a strainer. In this judgment, the 
Court defined straining as “a situation of forced stress in the workplace, 
in which the victim suffers at least one negative effect, […] which […] is 
also of a prolonged nature”. A fundamental requirement is that there be 
an imbalance in power between the perpetrator and the victim. “Straining 
is carried out specifically against one or more people but always in a 
discriminatory manner”. 
The new term has also become part of the lexicon used by the 
Supreme Court of Cassation, which, applying the dichotomous approach, 
has also gone far beyond the notion of mobbing in the strict sense. In a 
clear attempt to draw a distinction between mobbing and straining, the 
Court recently ruled that in the case of straining, the worker suffers 
“hostile actions (...) limited in number and partly spaced over time”, 
clarifying that – the S.C. goes on to add – these actions must be such as 
to cause the victim “a negative, constant and permanent effect on 
working conditions” capable of endangering his or her health43. Therefore, 
although the requirements for mobbing are not satisfied, the hostile 
actions may violate, if examined separately and distinctly, the employees’ 
fundamental constitutional rights. This means that, according to the 
Supreme Court, the demarcation line between mobbing and straining is 
to be based on “quantitative” elements consisting of a “different form of 
bullying characterized by the non-continuous nature of the vexatious 
actions”44. However, this approach is not at all convincing, as it can easily 
give rise to misunderstandings. In the scholarship, straining has been 
designated as a protection for the employee against one single hostile 
                                                          
43 Cassation March 29, 2018, No. 7844. 
44 Cass., February 19, 2016, No. 3291. 
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act, which, in itself unlawful, produces ongoing consequences over time 
and is perceived negatively by the “strained” party. Therefore, even being 
demoted to a lower-level position at work (“demansionamento”) – which 
is the typical example of a single act for which legal protected is afforded 
under art. 2103 of the Italian Civil Code – can constitute straining when 
the above-mentioned preconditions are met, and if, according to some 
authors, there is malicious intent on the part of the perpetrator45. 
This is why it is important to distinguish between mobbing and 
straining and to refer the distinction to both qualitative and quantitative 
criteria. Otherwise, straining would lose its distinctive features and could 
be used in an improper and arbitrary manner. The risk of an excessive 
emphasis on the quantitative criteria appears to be very concrete, 
especially when one considers that in a recent ruling the Supreme Court 
even seems to argue that straining exists  even in the absence of a 
malicious intent by the perpetrator of the act, as it states that the 
employer has a duty to organize his company in a way that reduces the 
risk of stressogenic situations and that in any case the victim may seek 
damages “even in the event of failure to prove a precise malicious 
intent”46. 
In conclusion, the view that the quantification of the damage for pain 
and suffering is closely and exclusively linked to the extent of abusive 
behaviour manifested is not convincing since, in the event of straining, as 
indeed in the case of mobbing, the protection provided for by 
antidiscrimination legislation in the case of “moral harassment” could be 
applicable (see above), which, as stated, is considered to be a form of 
discrimination [see Decrees 215 and 216 of 2003 (Article 2) and Decree 
198 of 2006 (Art. 26)]. This means that the criteria for quantifying the 
damage must be able to ensure “real and effective compensation or 
reparation”, which has to be determined in such a way as to be 
“dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered” (Art. 18 of 
Directive 2006/54/ EC). Therefore, in order to determine the amount of 
compensation, it is necessary to consider not only the damage suffered, 
but also a series of other elements, such as those relating to the role of 
the interests adversely affected (i.e. the dignity, health and personal 
integrity of the victim protected under art. 2087 ICC), and not only in 
terms of compensation for damage but also as a means of punishment 
and dissuasion. There exists therefore the possibility that an employer 
may have to pay a greater sum in damages for harm to the personal 
                                                          
45 Ege, 2019, p. 113. 
46 Cass. March 29, 2018, n. 7844. 
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integrity of the worker in the case of a single action than for the harm 
caused by mobbing. 
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